The work has established that the teaching of moral virtue (as providing a rationale for authoritative appeals to morality) has been woefully lacking in African schools today and so there is need to revisit it if children are to be moulded into good moral citizens. Through the use of conceptual analysis and the questionnaire method, it was observed that authoritative appeals to morality alone could not increase the child's moral awareness; neither did it improve the child's moral reasoning structures. About 60 pupils from four primary schools in Harare participated in "this study and the results of the study showed that authoritative appeals to morality did very little in morally conscientising children in primary schools. The study also challenged Aristotle who had argued that moral virtues could not be taught as they were informed by habit (Ostwald, 1962:33). The work advocated for the position that moral virtue cannot be formed by habit alone. Rather; it can be aided by moral instruction, as this would provide the underlying rationale or justification for authoritatively appealing to moral rules and principles. To this end, the paper re-examined some of the moral rules and principles (as sources of morality) with a view to establishing whether through appealing to such rules and principles, moral virtue can be successfully cultivated in our citizens. These two sources were divided into authoritative and rational appeals to rules and principles in citizenship education.
Introduction
There has been a tendency to confuse authoritative precepts to morality or to reduce morality to mere conventions. Even inThe Republic, Socrates is grappling with this problem where he is trying to convince the sophists that justice, as a moral concept, cannot be reduced to mere conventions, but is an inner state of the soul with each of its parts being able to fulfil its own function under the rule of reason which enlists the aid of the spirited part 102 i (the feelings) in controlling the appetites (Crube, 1974: 86) . This work will n o t howevei; concentrate on arguments and refutations in The Republic , but it will show that although authoritative appeals to rules and principles can be very important to non-moral agents such as infants or kindergartens, in the first stage of Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development, such authoritative appeals need not be taken as th e final source of moral virtue, the end in view o f moral instruction. Inasmuch as children will always be required to obey authority, they also need the underlying rationale behind such authoritative pronouncements, be it defacto or c/e/ureThis work gives a catalogue of authoritative appeals to rules and principles and tries to explain how and why such appeals fall short of being called moral precepts. The work, therefore, seeks to show that reason and reason alone should define morality. Children need to know why certain rules should be obeyed or why certain actions should be avoided. This is the sam e project that Aristotle is undertaking in The Nicomachean Ethics to show that moral virtue should be informed by reason aided by habit. T h e only difference is that for Aristotle, moral virtue cannot be taught vyhiie the position of this paper is that moral teaching can complete the process.. The project o f teaching in schools can only proceed if the concept o f virtue is re-em phasised. This m ay sound.like a direct challenge to Aristotle who believes that moral virtue cannot be taught, but the point .is that since it is possible to initiate children into certain authoritative rules and principles, all th a t instructors or teachers need to do is to explain to children reasons why w e should respect certain rules or conventions.
Instrumentation and Procedure
In this research, conceptual analysis was used as a research instrument to establish w hether through appealing-to authority alone, pupils can be introduced to moral reasoning structures and learn to be good citizens, it was established, during the course of this study, that children accepted certain rules in class without being rationally conscious of their implications to their daily lives. O f the 60 pupils who were studied at four primary schools in Harare, 54 (9 0 % ) showed that they avoided being late to school for fear of punishment by their teachers. They also wanted to do well in class because o f certain rewards that cam e with such performances. It is, therefore, clear from this study that pupils were motivated more by extrinsic rewards to do well in class than by the fact that doing well w as something good in itself. T h e research involved one infant class (grade 2) and one junior class (grade 5 ) but the results obtained were almost the sam e. The pupiis and teachers
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w ere informed about the purpose of the study. They w ere assured that the data they were to provide were for academic purposes only and that the research was being done in strict confidence.
Research Methodology
The study was m eant to establish whether by appealing to authority alone, children can be taught to be good citizens. Since this is a study in the area of Philosophy, the method o f conceptual analysis w as used although the questionnaire method was constantly referred to. This method was used to fetch answers from 6 0 pupils at four Prim ary Schools in Harare. The random sampling method was used to select the classes: nam ely grades 2 and 5. T he only problem encountered through the use o f this questionnaire method was that some teachers could not return the questionnaires on time and others decided not to return them at all, making it very difficult to come up with accurate, inform ation regarding th e study. H ow ever, fo r those questionnaires which were returned,, the responses w ere quite clear and precise. W e will now delve into the core issues of the study by, first, briefly, defining citizenship education so as to position our argument.
Citizenship Education: A brief definition
One cannot define citizenship education before defining the concept o f a citizen, the concept of education and the concept of morality. A citizen, according to E.M Kirkpatrick (1983-230) , is a member of a state, a freem an/ woman or a civilian. Citizenship is, therefore, the state of being or of having rights and duties as a citizen. R .S Peters (1959: 8 5 ) defines education as a discipline that relates to some sort of processes in which a desirable state of mind develops. Education, for Peters, is a value-laden concept, that is, it is a moral concept, lo be educated is to be moral. Morality relates to those social rules or principles that guide and regulate human behaviour. In this article, citizenship education shall be defined as instruction in morality or moral virtue.
Authoritative appeals to rules and principles in citizenship education
It is important to note that many people today identify and equate moral principles with particular rules and these rules may often (though not always) depend on authoritative pronouncements of parents, teachers, or religious UNIVERSITY Of (Straughan, 1982: 54) . This is not, of course, the only kind of justification that could be offered for such rules. One might appeal to other 'non-authoritative' considerations such as personal satisfaction, social cohesion, the preservation of family unit or the prevention of a sexually transmitted infection. Nor should it be assumed that only sexual rules might be identified with morality in this way.. Straughan (1982: 55) maintains: "because the main point of issuing authoritative pronouncements is to rule out the possibility of independent judgement, attempts to define the 'moral content' this way are bound to be futile." Nothing can become morally right because someone says that it is so, and that obedience to an authority is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the business of moral decision-making. Rather, some degree of free choice and independent judgements seems to be a necessary part of what it means to be a moral agent (Peters, 1981:252) , Given that authoritative pronouncements may be based on mistaken assumptions or wrong premises, it would be absurd for one to hold on to such appeals as, I love CAPS United Football Club or Dynamos Football Club, without having a rational basis for that. Authoritative pronouncements can only be used as sources of justification if they are accompanied by a rationale. Against this background, Straughan (1982: 26) quotes Kurt Baier who says, If I hold that it is wrong to drink or smoke because my father says so, arid if it really is the fact alone that he does say so to which I am. appealing, then my belief is of an arbitrary kind, which cannot count as a moral judgement. But if l.hold that it is wrong to drink or smoke because my father has pointed and explained to me the dangers and problems which these activities may create...then my belief does not rest upon the mere fact of his making a'pronouncement, but upon . other considerations to which he has drawn my attention and which I have independently evaluated myself. .
As Baier maintains, a person may value the moral advice and guidance of some people on the basis of them directing his attention to the moral aspects of situations in a way which the person may find illuminating (Ibid, 1982:62) .
Clearly, extreme versions of this view which rely solely on the fact that suchand-such ah authority exists and pronounces will result in rigid codes of conduct being laid down for children to follow unquestioningly, often reinforced by punishments to be inflicted for breaches of the authority's rules though whether such a process can properly be allowed the title of moral education is questionable. Immanuel Kant, who argues that morality cannot be hypothetical but rather categorical, heavily challenges this. Hypothetical imperatives for Kant, set conditions for actions, for example, if you want to get the job, then you should pass the interview. Morality cannot be understood this way but in the categorical sense, which stipulates reasons for actions. For instance, "murder is bad because it is motivated by bad intentions" (Guyer, 1998:81).
However, the highest moral accolade will probably be reserved for respect of authority itself as a general rule or principle, because it is only through adherence to that precept that such a system can be maintained: "Conversely, critical questions will be treated as educational and moral vices rather than virtues, as they may pose a threat to the status and reputation of the authority in question" (Straughan, 1982:57) .
The description of the source of moral virtue sounds proper, yet there must be a few teachers or parents who can deny ever having responded to a child's "why...?" With that most economical of answers, "Because I say so!" and indeed is this answer always to be deplored? Elaborate, reasoned explanation and justification is inappropriate in the hurly-burly of a classroom or play ground of family riot, and an emphatic reference to the teacher's or parent's role as an authority on such occasions may be the most effective (or the only) way of supporting a moral directive. Yet, although this kind of procedure may occasionally be justifiable, Straughan (1982: 57) argues that, The fact remains that a system of control, which tries to transmit a particular code of conduct to children, simply by pointing to the fact that the code is prescribed by some authority, canpot claim to be doing anything that can be called either moral or educational.
Getting children to be obedient, for Straughan, is not teaching them to be good. The learning of conventional rules and principles is problematic in that "...young children do, as a matter of fact, see the dictates of authority as a sufficient and valid form of moral justification" (Straughan, 1982: 58) . For Straughan, appeals to authority may, however, be unavoidable when dealing with young children.. .it would be surprising or paradoxical to discover
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Fainos Mangena 107 that children have to pass through certain non-moral stages of thinking before they can get to grips with morality proper, if w e wish children to com e to exercise their moral judgement at some stage, it would seem that to offer, simple reasoned justifications for rules even to young children can at worst do no harm, and may at best encourage the gradual development of more rational thinking (Straughan, 1982: 58) .
As Peters postulates, "teaching implies the exercise of various forms of authority. So teaching children to be good citizens can hardly be a totally non-authoritative business even though morality can never be defined in terms of mere obedience to authority" (Nibblet, 1963: 18 These "practical problems", as Straughan (1982: 7 6 ) likes to cal! them, however; do not pose any real threat to Peters' position, for he is not claiming to provide a moral instruction manual with answers tailor-made for all contingencies, but rather a general framework of guiding principles which all moral deliberation must take into account. The main difficulty about Peters' argument is that one must participate in the moral field or area, or in Straughan's terms, one must be a moral agent before its force can be felt. Peters seems to be saying that before accepting any ruies there is need to seriously reflect on them, to puzzle through rather than to simply accept them because they come from a respectable authority. 
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But how can children be encouraged to develop towards this level? This is the paradox of moral education. For the m ajor difficulty here is that young children are far from being rational or autonomous characters able to appreciate that reasons can justify rules and that rules can be in partially evaluated and revised as was observed during the course o f this study. Thus, the virtues are implanted in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature. We are, by nature, equipped with the ability to receive them and habit brings this ability to completion arid fulfilment {Ibid, 1 96 2:33 ). Aristotle, here, seems to be suggesting that'moral virtues cannot be imparted to children by means of formal instruction, but he is somehow silent as to how habit and habit alone can form these Virtues. The thesis defended in this work is that whije it may be difficult, or rathei; impossible for moral virtue to be taught'(as Aristotle reasoned), moral, instruction can enhance habit in the candour o f rrioral formation.. Jt is this teaching or moral instruction which will provide the underlying rationale as to why some, actions are good while others are bad. Moral instruction will help children to run away from dogmatic authoritative. app ealsto moral rules and principles and appreciate the meaning and value o f such rules and/or principles. 
It is my humble submission, in this paper
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Thus, the study of ethics is the key to understanding moral conduct and to improving the human spiritual condition. Surely, the optimists contend, this . objective is worth of attention in academic curricula. Socrates reflects this view when he remarks rather bluntly in Plato's Apology that, "the unexamined life is not worth living:" However, even Socrates, apparently doubted at one time that morality was teachable, but the urgent public criticism of the ethical.. standards of the professions, in general compels us to accept the optimistic view of ethics instruction. This also vindicates Peters' position that children must be taught a set of "basic rules" which they come to adopt as habits in as rational a manner as is possible for them at that time, until they are able to think more critically about how such rules must be justified.
However, Peters raises a fundamental question: "But how are we to decide what these "basic rules" are to be? (Peters, 1974: 272 There is probably more room for disagreement here than Peters ajlows over which ' basic rules" children should be taught, th is list of rules is a short one, which could hardly constitute an adequate moral code for young children yet even this limited set of rules, may not be accepted by all reflective people as being unquestioningly moral. Bring together a group of parents which includes some Marxists, child-centred atheists, some squatters, some gypsies and some fundamentalist Christians all of whom would, of course, claim to' be reflective people, and you are not likely to find much agreement o v e r: particular rules about property, contracts and the care of the young, even if they all accept the general principles which Peters enumerates. Straughan raises this question, "so are we to decide upon a commonly agreed set; of moral rules to which children should become habituated in the .early stages of their moral developm ent?"/^ 1982: 78).
Despite.these difficulties, which tend to confront any study of morality and moral education, Peters' work in this area is extremely useful, in particular, the way in which he tries to reconcile his account of morality with the facts of child development produces a realistic picture of how moral education, might proceed, it illustrates well, how philosophical questions have to be asked about the nature of morality itself before one can decide whether or not one can teach children to be good citizens or whether it is possible to instruct children in moral virtue:
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Conclusion.
The work looked at morality and moral virtue with a view to showing how and to what extent authority can be used as a source of morality and/or moral rules and principles in the moral development of the African child. An attempt was made to show that authority could only provide the raw materials and reason could complete such efforts, for authority without justification in the cognitive moral development of the child is bound to be futile. The work also looked at the place of moral instruction or teaching as the window through which moral virtues could be attained. For all intents and purposes, Aristotle, the Cynics and the Sceptics had defended the thesis that moral virtue could not be taught as it was attained through the courtyard of habit.
In the final analysis, the paper challenged this Aristotelian position by maintaining that habit alone was not enough to justify the existence of moral rules and principles, hence, the need to place emphasis on moral instruction or teaching both at informal (family) and at formal (school) level.
